Monday, May 16, 2005

A Separate Kurdish Nation?

A key component to the future of a united Iraq is the Kurdish situation. The Kurds comprise 20 percent of the Iraqi population and dominate the three northern provinces. Much speculation has been made in the international press about the potential of a separate Kurdish nation. But military and economic realities make the likelihood of a separate Kurdish nation virtually impossible. This will help prevent an Iraqi civil war.

The Kurds were persecuted under Saddam, and hundreds of thousands were killed, dislocated from their homes, and oppressed. The Kurds I’ve met are extremely proud and fly the flag of Kurdistan instead of the Iraqi flag. They refer to themselves as “proud members of the coalition.” The Kurdish people would love to have their sovereignty. But the costs of sovereignty would outweigh the benefits.

My first assignment in the US Army was in eastern Turkey in 1989, the year that a rebellion began in eastern Turkey that received relatively little international press but killed thousands of people over the next ten years. The Kurds in eastern Turkey were fighting for a separate Kurdish nation in southeast Turkey. In my current assignment, my unit has responsibility for the province of Kirkuk, which is heavily Kurdish. I have traveled throughout the Kurdish region and had exposure now to Turkish and Iraqi Kurds.

The press seems to continuously mention the possibility of a separate Kurdish nation because the Kurds discuss it often. While the Kurds would love to have their own nation, in my opinion, this discussion is merely a way in which to gain other concessions. Most Kurds with any influence or understanding of their situation believe a Kurdish nation is impossible.

There are large populations of Kurds in each country bordering northern Iraq: Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Each of these countries fear the development of a Kurdish nation and the accompanying loss of land and resources. The three threatened considerable efforts to prevent a Kurdish nation. Their desire to prevent this cannot be over emphasized.

The economic situation in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq make the development of a Kurdish nation all but impossible. There are two major industries in the Kurdish provinces: oil and agriculture. Both are highly dependent upon cooperative neighbors. Agriculture needs water and virtually all of Iraq's water comes from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers – the former flowing from Turkey, the latter from Syria. Both rivers have significant dams and all water could be eliminated from flowing into the Kurdish areas if the Turks so chose. The Kurdish areas have no water ports. The exportation of oil from these provinces is highly dependent upon cooperative relations with Syria and Turkey. The provinces currently have, and in the future would need, significant trading partnerships with these neighbors. The development of a separate Kurdish nation would restrict Kurdish trade as the neighbors oppose its development.

Given this unpleasant potential future for a Kurdish nation, it is unlikely that the Kurds would try to separate. As it is, the Kurds have won their freedom and have enjoyed autonomy since 1996 under the "no fly zone," protected by American and British air power. The Kurdish economy is booming relative to the rest of Iraq. It is a peaceful area and operates with virtually no coalition forces because of the peace that it enjoys. While the Kurdish provinces are part of Iraq they maintain the benefits of the Iraqi nation as well as considerable autonomy.

Despite suffering terribly under Saddam and the Baathist regime, The Kurds have not sought revenge. The foreign fighters, who are attacking the Sunnis and Kurds in an attempt to start a civil war, have been unsuccessful. They will continue to be unsuccessful. The Kurds have won their freedom. They have lost hundreds of thousands under the previous regime. The loss of a few more hundred people, while tragic, is unlikely to provoke the Kurdish people into a civil war that will gain them nothing yet cost them considerably.

The Kurds will use talk of a "Kurdish nation" to gain more in their negotiations with the Shi'ite majority. Together they comprise 80 percent of the Iraqi population and are highly dependent upon each other and will likely reach a consensus. The remaining wildcard is the Sunni population. They realize they have to work with the Kurds and the Shi'ite and are currently negotiating for the best possible scenario. Violence between January's elections and this December's ratification of the Constitution benefits the Sunnis, and they are sympathetic to the violence. The more violence, the more the Kurds and Shi'ites will reach out to the Sunni's and make concessions.

Unfortunately for the Sunnis, they allowed foreign fighters into their areas leading up to the January election. Their goals were aligned with the foreign fighters at the time – the destruction of American armed forces. But as the governments of many Arab nations learned, once you allow terrorists into your midst they often pursue their own goals. This is why the Saudi government now finds itself fighting the terrorists they initially allowed into their country.

Once the Constitution is ratified in December, the Sunnis will not likely be supportive of the insurgency. Many more Iraqi military and police forces will have been trained. At that point the tide of the war will begin to turn and all three factions will likely align their goals to fight the insurgents.

Understanding the Kurdish situation is critical to understanding the Iraqi situation. Fortunately, due to the economics, the Kurds will likely choose to remain part of Iraq. And that is good for all of us.